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Helvering v. Clifford:
The Supreme Court Spoils the Broth
Mark L. Ascher*
Any progressive tax invites efforts to splinter the base. Two taxes
on half are almost always less than one on the whole. Without clear
limitations on income splitting, progressivity soon evaporates. In the
case of the federal income tax, Congress enacts limitations by statute,
and the Treasury promulgates limitations by regulation. Sometimes, the
Supreme Court construes either a statute or a regulation. Sometimes,
too many cooks spoil the broth.
Central to the operation of any tax, and crucial to any progressive
tax, is taxpayer status. The more a tax respects artificial taxpayers, the
less its actual progressivity. Although always nominally progressive, the
federal income tax has also always respected the existence of many artificial taxpayers, including most trusts. Currently, the main repository of
rules as to which trusts are separate taxpayers are the so-called grantor
trust rules.1 They are the spawn of Helvering v. Clifford.2 Long before
Clifford, however, Congress had already enacted its own grantor trust
rules. As early as 1924, these original grantor trust rules provided, as
their successors still do, that the settlor (or, in the terminology of the
Internal Revenue Code, the “grantor”) of an inter vivos trust who reserved the right to revoke the trust or retained beneficial enjoyment of
the trust income was taxable individually on the trust’s income.3 Thus,
the original grantor trust rules, like their successors, disregarded the taxpayer status of certain trusts.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue concluded that the original grantor trust rules were under-inclusive. When Congress balked,4 the Bureau litigated, and, in 1940, Clifford reached the Supreme Court. The
settlor had created an irrevocable trust for a five-year term for the benefit of his wife and had retained a reversion in the entire corpus. As
* Hayden W. Head Regents Chair for Faculty Excellence, University of Texas
School of Law.
1 I.R.C. §§ 673-679, or “Subpart E.”
2 309 U.S. 331, 337-38 (1940).
3 Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, ch. 234, § 219(g), (h), 43 Stat. 253, 277
(codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 676-677).
4 An Act to Provide Revenue, Equalize Taxation, and for Other Purposes: Hearing
on H.R. 7835 Before the Comm. on Finance, 73d Cong. 1-2, 5 (1934).
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trustee, he had also retained substantial control over the trust, including
the power to determine how much, if any, trust income his wife would
actually receive.5 The issue before the Court was whether the settlor
remained individually subject to taxation on the trust’s income, notwithstanding the fact that, until the trust terminated, the income was payable
exclusively to his wife.6
In an expansive opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court held that the
settlor was indeed taxable on the trust’s income.7 The Court anchored
its opinion on the predecessor of the vacuous section 61.8 “The broad
sweep of [the statute] indicates the purpose of Congress to use the full
measure of its taxing power . . . . Th[e] issue is whether the grantor after
the trust has been established may still be treated . . . as the owner of the
corpus.”9 Of course, the predecessor of section 61 offered nothing even
vaguely like an answer to that question, and the grantor trust rules already on the books suggested to almost everyone else that Congress had
deliberately accorded separate taxpayer status to trusts of this and many
other sorts.10 Undeterred, the Court continued: “In absence of more
precise standards or guides supplied by statute or appropriate regulations, the answer . . . must depend on an analysis of the terms of the
trust and all the circumstances attendant on its creation and
operation.”11
The remainder of the opinion pointed out, but in only the most
general of ways, the terms of the trust and the attendant circumstances
that required disregarding the trust’s taxpayer status. First, there was
the family relationship: “[W]here the grantor is the trustee and the beneficiaries are members of his family group, special scrutiny of the arrangement is necessary lest what is in reality but one economic unit be
multiplied into two or more by devices which, though valid under state
law, are not conclusive so far as [the predecessor of section 61] is concerned.”12 Of course, the vast majority of trusts are for the benefit of
family members, and settlors often serve as trustees. Next, the Court
5 Any income that did not go to her currently would, however, go to her upon
termination. 309 U.S. at 332.
6 For the year at issue, the settlor, as trustee, had in fact distributed all of the trust
income to his wife, and she had reported it on her own return. Id. at 333-34.
7 Id. at 336.
8 Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 216-73, ch. 277, § 22(a), 48 Stat. 680 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 22(a) (1939)); I.R.C. § 61(a) (“[G]ross income includes all income
from whatever source derived . . . .”).
9 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940).
10 See Erwin N. Griswold, Forward to BERNARD WOLFMAN, JONATHAN L. F. SILVER & MARJORIE SILVER, DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION: THE BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES (1975).
11 309 U.S. at 335.
12 Id.
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focused on three aspects of the trust: “[T]he short duration of the trust,
the fact that the wife was the beneficiary, and the retention of control
over the corpus by respondent all lead irresistibly to the conclusion that
respondent continued to be the owner for purposes of [the predecessor
of section 61].”13 Of course, none of these features, singly or together,
had yet led Congress to enact legislation ignoring the trust’s taxpayer
status. Finally, the Court got to what seems to have been for Justice
Douglas the heart of the matter: “So far as [the settlor’s] dominion and
control were concerned . . . the trust did not effect any substantial
change. . . .”14
Plainly, the Court relied on the fact that the term of the trust was
unusually short, and that the settlor had retained a reversion, but the
Court was unwilling to say that short-term trusts, or trusts with reversionary interests in their settlors, or short-term trusts with reversionary
interests in their settlors would always be grantor trusts. Likewise, the
Court relied on the fact that the trust’s primary beneficiary was the settlor’s wife, although, here too, the Court was unwilling to say that all
trusts that provided for the payment of income to the settlor’s spouse
would be grantor trusts. Finally, the fact that, as trustee, the settlor had
retained substantial control over the trust corpus seems to have been
relevant; yet, here again, the Court was unwilling to say that all trusts
over which the settlor had similar sorts of control would be grantor
trusts. “[N]o one fact is normally decisive[;] all considerations and circumstances of the kind we have mentioned are relevant . . . .”15
Predictably, the floodgates of litigation opened wide.16 After Clifford, just about the only inter vivos trusts whose taxable status remained
clear were those described in the original, statutory grantor trust rules.17
Five years later, hoping to stem the flood, the Treasury issued the socalled Clifford regulations.18 They called for taxing the settlor in three
additional situations. First, the settlor was subject to taxation on the
trust’s income if he or she had a reversionary interest following a trust
term of less than 10 years.19 Second, subject to numerous exceptions,
the settlor was taxable on the trust’s income if either the settlor or a
non-adverse party had a power to control beneficial enjoyment of either
13

Id.
Id.
15 Id. at 336.
16 1 STANLEY S. SURREY, WILLIAM C. WARREN, PAUL R. MCDANIEL & HUGH J.
AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1340 (1972) (“[T]he Clifford case set off a large volume of litigation. In the Courts of Appeals alone, over a
hundred cases were decided that involved trusts and the section defining gross income.”)
17 See Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, 153 F.2d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 1945).
18 T.D. 5488, 1946-1 C.B. 19.
19 Treas. Reg. § 29.22(a)-21(b)(1), (c)(1) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 673).
14
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income or corpus.20 Third, the settlor was subject to taxation on the
trust’s income if he or she had various administrative powers.21 In 1954,
Congress elevated the new regulations to the statutory canon, codifying
them, alongside the original grantor trust rules, at sections 671 to 678 of
the Internal Revenue Code, where they remain today, in mostly the
same form as when they were enacted.
One reaction to Clifford is that although the Court went well beyond prior congressional intent, Congress eventually embraced the gist
of the decision and folded it into the Code. Moreover, in the last six
decades, few stretches of the Code have proven more durable. But such
adulation is entirely unwarranted. In fact, Congress reversed Clifford’s
actual holding. The Code now unequivocally designates Subpart E as
the sole repository of rules regarding the effect of a settlor’s retention of
dominion and control on a trust’s taxpayer status.22 Congress has thus
pointedly stripped the courts of the interpretative space to which Justice
Douglas laid claim. In addition, much water has by now passed under
the bridge. Congress continues, as it should, to enact new rules and to
amend old ones. Two such changes, all by themselves, render Clifford
superfluous on its own facts. In 1948, Congress created the joint return,
and in 1969, Congress expanded section 677, whose predecessor predated Clifford, to describe not only trusts in which the settlor has interests in or powers over income but also trusts in which the settlor’s
spouse has such interests or powers.23 Thus, it is now possible to reach
the Clifford result on the Clifford facts, without reference to any of the
provisions Congress added, cleaning up after Clifford.
But all that’s small potatoes. In 1986, Congress turned the fiduciary
income tax world upside-down with a single, breathtakingly simple
change: bracket compression in section 1(e). The federal income tax
for taxpaying trusts is now basically a flat tax—imposed at the highest
rate. The big-picture objective was also breathtakingly simple: to eliminate the income tax incentive to create a taxpaying trust. The change
has worked brilliantly; these days, no one creates a taxpaying trust, just
to save income taxes. The concomitant effect of making a taxpaying
trust much less attractive, however, has been to make a grantor trust,
i.e., a trust whose settlor continues to pay the taxes on the income the
trust produces, much more attractive. In short, bracket compression re20

Treas. Reg. § 29.22(a)-21(b)(2), (d) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 674).
Treas. Reg. § 29.22(a)-21(b)(3), (e) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 675).
22 I.R.C. § 671 (“No items of a trust shall be included in computing the taxable
income and credits of the grantor or of any other person solely on the grounds of his
dominion and control over the trust under section 61 . . . or any other provision of this
title, except as specified in this subpart.”).
23 I.R.C. § 677(a)(1).
21
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versed the polarity of the grantor trust rules. Conceived as limitations
on the use of taxpaying trusts as tax-saving devices, the grantor trust
rules now offer numerous ways to save taxes by creating non-taxpaying
trusts. By creating a trust that includes among its terms an interest or a
power that “runs afoul” of Subpart E, a settlor can ensure that the income is not subject to taxation under section 1(e). Instead, the income
is subject to taxation at the settlor’s own, possibly lower, rate. Moreover, paying what are for all intents and purposes other people’s income
taxes makes very good transfer tax sense. In short, what was once an
anti-tax-avoidance device has become a candy dispenser for rich folk
smart enough to retain ACTEC counsel. Since 1986, the grantor trust
rules really have been too good to be true. They should be repealed.24
Yet they remain. Shame on Congress. But, mostly, shame on the Supreme Court.
Thus ends my tale. In Clifford, the Supreme Court examined an
area of tax law in which Congress had repeatedly legislated but had not
yet satisfied the tax collector. Resorting to cosmic statutory interpretation, the Court “fixed” the “problem.” Luckily for the Court, regulations rationalized its slovenly work, and Congress eventually codified it.
The mutant product worked well enough until 1986, when Congress invented a vastly better mousetrap. Now, the grantor trust rules are just a
candy dispenser for well-counselled rich folk. All because, back in 1940,
the Supreme Court spoiled the broth.

24 Mark L. Ascher, The Grantor Trust Rules Should Be Repealed, 96 IOWA L. REV.
885, 940 (2011).

